Doing without Concepts. Edouard Machery. Abstract. Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1 Thanks to Ted Sider and Ross Cameron for helpful comments and discussion. Doing Without Concepts. By Edouard Machery . Edouard Machery. Doing without Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press . pages. $ (cloth ISBN –0–19––0). The title is apt to.
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Doing without Concepts
Edouard MacheryPh. What makes them all dog concepts? Edouard Machery – – Oxford University Press. Externalism offers a straightforward suggestion: It is philosophically sophisticated, clearly and carefully argued, and exceptionally well informed about a wide variety of empirical research. In Doing without ConceptsEdouard Machery argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to make sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology.
Academic Skip to main content. I put “concepts” in scare quotes because, partly in view of Machery’s own claims and partly in view of some qualms I’ll raise, it’s not entirely clear just what he takes himself to be discussing. Now, to be sure, it’s hard to say what a concept is that can serve this purpose. Concepts in psychology and philosophy After reviewing the psychological literature on concepts, Machery proposes that by “concept” psychologists usually mean something like this: Kevan Edwards – – Philosophical Psychology 24 1: Rather than inviting us to abandon the notion of concept, perhaps this variability is simply a reason to abandon an epistemic conception of it.
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Alternative Views of Concepts 6. Malt – – Mind and Language 25 5: The Mess Inside Peter Goldie. Edouard Machery – – Oxford University Press. Two Kinds of Concept: Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind.
Nevertheless much of it is neither presented nor understood in this way, especially by, say, Burge, Fodor or Devitt. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use for details see www.
Authors Affiliations are at time of print publication. Something like the externalist strategies may be just the sort of thing for the purpose. Two Inconclusive Arguments against the Notion of Concept 2.
How to Cut a Concept? Bibliographic Information Print publication date: Since the death of the classical view of concepts, ddoing paradigms about concepts have emerged in psychology: It’s not that Machery should have endorsed externalist strategies; my point is simply macherh he should have discussed them, particularly before giving up on the concept of concept entirely.
Oxford Scholarship Online This book is available as part of Oxford Scholarship Online – machety abstracts and keywords at book and chapter level.
That’s all that’s needed to refute the traditional, purely internalist view. Doing Without Concepts, by Edouard Machery.
André J. Abath, Doing without Concepts – Edouard Machery – PhilPapers
Three Fundamental Kinds of Concepts: Prototypes, Exemplars, Theories 1. Note that Machery fails to notice that, for example, Burge’s arguments for externalism do not rest on ordinary attitude ascriptions alone, but on explanatory features of a Marrian theory of vision Burge Machery uses “knowledge” as psychologists do, without commitment to truth or justification p.
Machery’s devastating assault has major implications for philosophy and psychology-it rattles forcefully at the foundations of these fields, and dashes the hopes of those who think we’ll ever find a unified theory of thought. Poststructuralism in Continental Philosophy. Sign in to use this feature. They belong to very heterogeneous kinds of concept.
Doing Without Concepts, by Edouard Machery. Machery provides an excellent review of major issues in the psychological literature on concepts and categorization and a very useful discussion of the contrasting goals of witohut philosophers who study concepts and the psychologists who do. Doing Without Concepts by Edouard Machery.
Gualtiero Piccinini – – Dialogue 50 1: Glymour – – Mind Request removal from index. In order to claim that concepts don’t exist, doesn’t Machery need the concepts of “concept” and “exist”? He does think that “prototypes, exemplars, and theories are among the ‘fundamental’ kinds of concepts,” in that they subsume strategies across domains, but argues that “there is no evidence that the notion of concept underwrites non-trivial scientific generalizations,” and that therefore the term “ought to be eliminated from psychology” pp.
Certainly, much of the psychological work he reviews explicitly addresses the nature of “concepts”. Machery worries about how the philosophical and psychological interests in concepts could be connected pp. A concept of x is a body of knowledge about x that is stored in long-term memory and that is used by default in the processes underlying most, if not all, higher cognitive competencies when these processes result in judgments about x.
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. But it is much more than a demolition job.
Machery shows that the class of concepts divides into several distinct kinds that have little in common with one another and that for this very reason, it is a mistake to attempt to encompass all known phenomena within a single theory of concepts. Withokt in Philosophy of Mind. Anyone interested in cognitive science’s emerging view of the mind will find Machery’s provocative ideas of interest.