Download Citation on ResearchGate | Content and Self-Knowledge | La these Pastist externalists (e.g., Boghossian ; Burge ) maintain that the past. Volume 17, Issue 1, Spring Philosophy of Mind. Paul A. Boghossian. Pages DOI: /philtopics Content and Self-Knowledge. Content and Self-Knowledge. Paul A. Boghossian University of Michigan. INTRODUCTION I. This paper argues that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis.

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Yet in light of his resistance, Boghossian formulates a different version of the slow srlf-knowledge argument. If Oscar is thinking that water is wet, then E obtains.

In which case, the environmental difference creates a difference in form as well as content. And putatively, the problem with armchair self-knowledge does not arise with narrow content.

Externalism and Self-Knowledge

Some externalists have even offered independent arguments to that effect Putnam Nevertheless, the suggestion that certain judgments are infallible can seem exceedingly strong. All this is important swlf-knowledge B 3since if W. But as before, the incompatibilist may respond that we are illicitly assuming E to be the condition simply that water exists.

In addition, it is sometimes argued that EXT and SK preclude the standard analysis of epistemic possibility. Moya – – In Maria J.


Paul Boghossian, Content and self-knowledge – PhilPapers

Rather, it denotes Twin Earth. But perhaps additional apriori considerations can rule this out Brown So even for empty concepts, content seems determined partly by facts about the environment including facts about what is absent from the environment. The incompatibilist might rejoin that c is stipulative in the thought experiment; but in that case, Burge sides with Brueckner a in rejecting b. Parent – – In Ed Zalta ed.

Even so, the first reading is not the usual interpretation of EXT.

The argument is this: In the acquisition process, however, the role of demonstrative identification may be unclear. Compatibilists reply, however, that the thought experiments suggest that a water thought metaphysically implies some content specific environmental condition, such as the existence of water Brueckner Thus, even if it is known that you are currently thinking that water is scrumptious, EXT may preclude armchair knowledge that you believe this.

Jacob once expressed this well as follows: And that is rather counterintuitive yet see Kripke on unicorns. Request removal from index. Apparently under this assumption, Descartes also believed that he could know the content of his thoughts while suspending all judgment about his environs. The question whether this conflict is real is what drives the contemporary debate on externalism and self-knowledge.


Goldman – – Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 1: If so, skeptical slow switch arguments end up being incoherent.

It is clear, however, that W. So given that 2 presupposes 3a non-empirical warrant for 3 makes possible an apriori warrant for 2.

If so, then a slow switch causes a kind of memory failure, since the knowledge initially stored in memory is not what is recalled. Yet assume he is agnostic on whether the concept applies to broad overstuffed armchairs.

Yet incompatibilists reply that the second reading cannot be what is really intended. Scepticism About Knowledge of Content. For Oscar no longer has water thoughts at t 2. David Pitt – – Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1: Foundations and ApplicationsM.